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INTRODUCTION 
In early March 1926, North China was engulfed by the war between Feng Yuxiang’s National 
Army (Guominjun, or known by the contemporaries as the Kuominchun, KMC thereafter) and 
the allied army of Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin. On 3 March, a small fleet consisted of the 
largest troopship of the Chinese Navy Hua Jia, set sail from Qingdao to Dagu, carrying over 
5,000 soldiers of the Zhili-Shandong Army for a daring mission. They were to land behind the 
National Army’s line, disrupt the KMC’s line of communication, divert troops from the front, 
and more importantly (and unknown until now) to seize the port to prevent shipment of arms 
from Russia to the KMC. In a few days, the troops were able to land unhindered, but they were 
soon surrounded after blowing up a railway bridge. By 10 March, this force was repulsed.  
The impact of this raid, however, was enormous. To prevent their enemies from landing more 
troops, the KMC laid mines off Dagu and deployed artillery pieces to guard the entrance of the 
waterway to Tianjin. The Powers protested, as they saw it as a violation of the 1901 Protocol, 
which forbid the Chinese from disrupting Beijing’s traffic to the sea. On 12 March, a Japanese 
destroyer exchanged fire with the KMC ashore. After that, an ultimatum was sent to the Beijing 
Government, demanding the immediately removal of mines and withdrawal of the KMC from 
Dagu. The Provisional Government complied, but its acceptance of the powers’ demand 
sparked off a massive rally in Beijing on 18 March.1 The crowd, led by Li Dazhao and Xu 
Qian (George Xu), demanded rejection of the powers’ ultimatum and expulsion of the 
diplomatic corps. After the rally, a smaller group marched to the office of the Provisional 
Government, and after some confusion the guards opened fire on the group, killing forty-seven 
and injured another hundred. Among the dead were several female students, including Liu 
Hezhen, to whom Lu Xun wrote his famous “In Memory of Miss Liu Hezhen”.  
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The place of the 18 March Incident in modern Chinese history was secured by Lu Xun’s 
writing in memory of Liu Hezhen. Since then, the “18 March Massacre” has been remembered 
as part of the nationalistic outburst against the imperialism and warlordism, and an event 
between the May Thirtieth Movement and the “national revolution” between 1926 and 1928 
(this revolution was seen by the communist historiography as a failure, only to be revisited 
recently by the new generation of Chinese historians). It was also seen as one of the first 
movements led by the communists, as it was led by Li Dazhao and other early Chinese 
communists in Beijing. The event was also long seen as a proof of the oppressive nature of the 
beiyang warlords and the Beijing Government, as well as their connection with the imperialist 
powers. Such impressions were reinforced by subsequent historiography, which were much 
influenced by the KMT (Guomindang, or Kuomintang, KMT) and the Chinese communists. 
With new sources, the details of the events and the role of the major participants such as Li 
Dazhao and Xu Qian were revisited. However, more questions surfaced as our understanding of 
the event improved. 
Studies Chinese politics between the end of the Second Zhili-Fengtian War (November 1924) 
and the beginning of the Northern Expedition (Jul 1926) usually focus on the development of 
the KMT in Canton and the activities of the Chinese communist party. Instead, this article tries 
to shed new lights on the 18 March Incident as well as the period by looking at the interplay 
between strategic design of different parties and the geopolitical and strategic situations in 
Northeast Asia between late 1924 and early 1926. It suggests that the incident was the result of 
the Soviet Union’s geopolitical and strategic failure in Northeast Asia. It also attempts to put a 
“Chinese” event in geopolitical and international contexts. However, this paper does not 
attempt to downplay the shooting of students or to judge the individuals’ action during the 
incident, nor is this merely an attempt to “rehabilitate” figures such as Duan Qirui, Zhang 
Zuolin, or the Beijing Government. Rather, it tries to show the opportunities presented by new 
sources and new perspectives in challenging the Revolutionary narrative by looking at the 
events from regional and international perspectives.  
1 SOVIET-KMT’S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY, 1925-6 
Feng Yuxiang and the Soviets on Offensive, Jan-Jun 1925 
In 1924, the Zhili Clique, which had controlled the central government in Beijing since 1922, 
was about to launch its final push to unify the country. Stood in the Zhili Clique’s way was the 
Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, Duan Qirui, the leader of the Anfu Clique, and Sun Yatsen 
in Canton. In August, the war between the Zhili-military governor of Jiangsu and the Anfu 
military governor of Zhejiang led to the outbreak of a large-scale civil war in North and Central 
China. Forestalling a Zhili invasion of Manchuria, the Fengtian forces under Zhang Zuolin 
moved into Rehe and attacked Shanhaiguan. After weeks of bloody fighting that led to heavy 
casualties on both sides, the bulk of the Zhili army was trapped in Shanhaiguan in late October. 
Volume 6, No. 4 
22 
Feng Yuxiang, a Zhili general who had secretly cooperated with Zhang Zuolin and Duan Qirui, 
returned to Beijing and staged a coup d’état on 23 October.2  
When Feng Yuxiang’s troops entered Beijing, he first installed a government, which was 
ignored by all parties and the powers. Desperately needed an ally, Feng cooperated somewhat 
reluctantly with the KMT, and invited Sun Yatsen to Beijing.3The Japanese and the Russians 
were anxious to influence the new government. The former had provided the money to bribe 
Feng, and now hoped to see the establishment of a government led by Duan Qirui and 
supported by Feng’s army to counter Zhang Zuolin’s growing influence.4 Meanwhile, through 
Li Dazhao, Feng met Lev Karakhan, the Soviet Ambassador to China.5 By then, the KMC had 
no source of armament because it was evicted out of Tianjin by the Fengtian troops and its 
advance towards Hubei was blocked by Shao Yaonan, the ex-Zhili military governor. To obtain 
arms, Hu Jingyi, a leader of the KMC, also approached the Soviets through Li Dazhao. In 
December, the Soviets promised Feng to provide arms and financial assistance in his attempt to 
drive Zhang Zuolin out of China, but Zhang soon escaped from the captial.6  
Geopolitical consideration was one of the most important considerations in Moscow’s alliance 
with Feng. In April, the newly formed China Committee of the Politburo, formed to organized 
Soviet aid to the KMT and KMC, demanded Feng to recognize the Soviet Union’s position in 
Mongolia and to allow the establishment of concessions within the area under KMC control.7 
It was difficult to know the exact demands and to what extent had Feng agreed to them, but 
arms were sent from Siberia to Kalgan through the Chita-Urga-Kalgan caravan route since 
April. Soviet instructors trained Feng’s troops, and KMT political activities and propaganda 
were allowed within the KMC.8  
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The Soviet moves in China were also part of their grand strategic arrangement against its main 
perceived enemy, the British Empire. The establishment of friendly regimes in North and South 
China would establish a pro-Moscow regime that controlled the area from the Northwest to the 
Eastern and Southern seaboard of China. If this succeeded, the Soviets’ eastern flank on 
Eurasia would be secured. A successful “national revolution” in China might also spread the 
revolution to the Asian colonies, particularly India, causing much trouble for the British, seen 
by the Soviets as their greatest enemy.9  
After securing an alliance, Feng Yuxiang and the Soviets became more active. Contrary to the 
Sino-Russian agreement in 1924, the Soviets intensified their activities in China and Manchuria. 
The Soviet embassies in Beijing and Harbin became the hub of communist infiltration to China, 
distributing agents and money from Harbin and Kalgan to the rest of the country. Karakhan 
himself participated in the agitations by giving inflammatory speeches in Beijing.10  The 
Soviets also acted high-handedly in the Chinese Eastern Railway (thereafter as CER). In April, 
M. Ivanov, the new Soviet director-general of the CER Bureau, ordered to dismiss all 
non-Soviet Russian staffs of the railway. As the Chinese authority refused to acknowledge 
Ivanov’s order, Karakhan protested to both Beijing and Mukden.  
The Soviets also seek rapprochement with the Japanese, who had adopted a more conciliatory 
attitude towards the Russians since 1924. In January 1925, the Soviets signed a treaty with the 
Japanese recognizing the latter’s special interest in South Manchuria in return for Japan’s 
recognition of the Soviet Union’s position in the CER. A month later, the Soviets even 
recognized the Twenty-One Demand in another agreement. Once again since 1907, Manchuria 
was divided into two spheres of influence between the Russians and the Japanese.11 
With Soviet support, the year of 1925 witnessed the rapid expansion of Feng Yuxiang’s KMC. 
In early 1925, troops under Feng Yuxiang, Sun Yue (Commander of the KMC Third Army), 
and Hu Jingyi (Commander of the KMC Second Army, his post was succeeded by Yue Weijin 
after his death in May 1925) had occupied in, Beijing, Kalgan, part of Zhili, Henan, and 
Shaanxi. In less than a year, the KMC extended its control over Chahar, Inner Mongolia, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, and Henan. The number of the KMC armies increased to around 300,000 in 
Henan alone before the war started in October 1925.12  
The Fengtian Clique’s Strategic Dilemma 
As the result of his victory, Zhang Zuolin faced a particularly difficult strategic situation in 
1925. The victory created a formidable opponent in the form of the National Army, in 
Northwest China, intensified Fengtian-Soviet conflicts, and alienated the Japanese. Zhang 
                                                     
9
 Erickson, John, The Soviet High Command: a Military-Political History, 1918-1941, (London, 2001), 238.  
10
 “Mr. Palairet to Mr. Austen Chamberlain,” 22/5/1925, F 2794/144/10, FOCP, Vol. 29, 167-8.  
11
 Bruce Ellemen, “The Soviet Union’s Secret Diplomacy Concerning the CER, 1924-1925,” in The Journal of 
Asian Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2, (May, 1994), 478-9.  
12
 Wen Gongzhi, 106-7; 184; Ding Wenjiang, Minguo junshi jinji, (Shanghai, 1926), 59-67. 
Volume 6, No. 4 
24 
could not even secure a dominant voice in the government he had helped to create. To regain 
strategic initiative, the Fengtian Clique expanded into North China, but everyone saw this as an 
aggressive move.  
By early 1925, Zhang Zuolin was convinced that the he was being encircled by a KMC-Soviet 
alliance and that Karakhan was the man behind it. Zhang’s relation with the Soviets also 
worsened because of the railway question. Zhang offered to buy the CER from the Soviets 
using the ruble banknotes issued by Tsarist government, but the Russians rejected. As Zhang 
was determined to take the railway, goodwill between Zhang and the Soviets quickly dissipated. 
The Soviets also refused to sell arms to Zhang as promised before the Second Zhili-Fengtian 
War because they would not arm Zhang to fight against their ally Feng Yuxiang. 
In retaliation, and as a gesture of goodwill to the Japanese, despite Soviet protest Zhang Zuolin 
consented to the extension of the Taonan railway to Qiqihar and the Jilin line to the eastern end 
of the CER in spring 1925.13 However, Zhang could find little support from the Japanese. In 
January, the Japanese Consul-General in Mukden Uchiyama Kiyoshi expressed his worry about 
Zhang’s growing influence in China.14 The British Ambassador to Tokyo Sir Charles Eliot 
reported that the Japanese “did not want to see him [Zhang] sweep the field and establishing 
himself as the master of Peking, where he would have been out of their control.” Zhang also 
tried to enlist British support; Consul-General Frederick Wilkinson of Mukden suggested that 
Zhang “never abandoned the hope of allying with Britain.”15 
Zhang Zuolin tried to strengthen his position in Northeast Asia by controlling the Beijing 
Government’s policy towards Japan and Russia. When the Provisional Government renewed 
the Sino-Russian negotiations that promised to be held after the conclusion of the 1924 
Sino-Soviet Agreement, Zhang opposed the appoint of the pro-KMT diplomat Wang Zhengting 
(C. T. Wang) as the chief negotiator, and demanded that he had the final say on the matters 
concerning Manchuria.16 
To check the expansion of the KMC and break the perceived isolation, Zhang Zuolin even 
considered a preventive strike against Feng, but the idea was soon dropped, fearing further 
alienating the already hostile people. Instead, Zhang consolidated and expanded the Fengtian 
Clique’s control over the provinces in China. In March, facing a possible KMC invasion of 
Anhui, Zhang proposed to send Fengtian troops there to support the civilian governor appointed 
by the Provisional Government. After the KMC’s invasion of Henan, the Fengtian military 
governor of Zhili ousted the KMC Third Army from Zhili province, cutting the connection 
between the KMC First Army in Beijing and the rest of the KMC armies in Henan. Zhang 
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himself even moved to Tianjin in May in the hope of checking Feng’s moves. Zhang also 
pressured the Provisional Government to appoint his subordinate Zhang Zongchang as the 
military governor of Shandong in the same month. 
However, these inherently defensive moves, together with his careless remark about the need to 
use force to unify China in February, had irreversibly shaped Zhang’s image as the aggressor.17 
With the help of KMT propaganda, Zhang was portrayed as a warmonger who wanted to 
conquer China throughout the year.  
Meanwhile, although the Provision Government rested its foundation on the precarious 
foundation on the alliance of expedient between Feng and Zhang, it had achieved some success, 
including the hosting of the Reconstruction Conference (xianhou huiyi), the preparation of the 
National Conference (guomin dahui) and the settlement of the Gold Franc Case with the French. 
Now most of these events went down in history as vain attempts by Duan to restore the central 
government. The last event allowed the Provisional Government to request the powers to attend 
the Tariff Conference in late 1925 as stipulated in the Washington Treaty. A possible outcome 
of this Conference would be the restoration of tariff autonomy of the central government, thus 
providing it a sizeable stable income. As Karakhan noted in Moscow, it was in the Soviet 
Union’s interest to prevent the success of this conference (see below).  
The May-Thirtieth Movement in the context of the struggle in the North, Jun-Aug 
1925  
The outbreak of anti-British movement after the May-Thirtieth Incident was by no means 
sudden and unexpected. The nationalistic fervour after the shooting in Shanghai on 30 May was 
certainly the result of the shooting itself and growing national awareness since the May Fourth, 
but it was also the result of continuous Soviet and KMT agitation from early 1925. When Sun 
Yatsen was travelling to Beijing to meet Duan Qirui, he blamed the “imperialist powers” for 
China’s problems. With Feng Yuxiang controlling Beijing and a large part of North China, 
Soviet agitation against the British intensified. Only a week before the shooting, the British 
Minister to China Ronald Macleay noted in a report about the danger of the agitation and 
growing xenophobia.18   
Zhang Zuolin and Feng Yuxiang’s attitude towards the shooting on 30 May was very different. 
Zhang was disturbed by the spread of radicalism in China, while Feng tried to profit from it. 
Zhang was convinced that the Soviets, the KMT, and Feng were behind the agitations. The 
arrest of Soviets agents with instructions about organizing anti-foreign agitation in Shanghai 
after the shooting reinforced Zhang’s idea.19 Zhang told the British that had he reached Beijing 
he would expel Karakhan, but he was warned that this meant war with the Soviet Union. Zhang 
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was so anxious to understand the powers’ attitude that his emissaries even went so far to ask the 
Italian Minister about the powers’ possible attitude in a war between China and the Soviet 
Union.20   
Zhang Zuolin shared the genuine anger of the Chinese against the foreigners but he remained 
convinced that continuous agitation and strike was “suicidal”. Zhang and the Fengtian 
leadership feared that Feng and the Soviets were using the upsurge of nationalist sentiment for 
their interest.21  Because of Zhang’s attitude, no incident occurred in Manchuria and Shandong, 
and the mass rallies there were conducted peacefully. From retrospect, although he shared the 
patriotic sentiment, he had underestimated the power of nationalism and propaganda. As the 
British Consul General to Mukden William Wilkinson noted, Zhang’s action of sending troops 
to Shanghai and suppression of agitation irreversibly damaged his image and made him prone 
to accusation of being the powers’ “running dog”.22 
On the other hand, Feng Yuxiang passionately attacked the “imperialist powers” and urged to 
declare war on Britain.23 His utterances found much support from the young radicals, but were 
criticized by more sober figures such as Liang Qiqiao and Ding Wenjiang, who pointed out the 
emptiness of Feng and his allies’ rhetoric.24  At the same time, he was also anxious to avoid 
being seen as a communist, as he openly suggested that communism was not suitable for 
China.25 This revealed the considerable apprehension, at least among some of the Chinese, 
about the Soviet motives in China.  
The Soviets also seized the opportunity presented by the incident to delay the Sino-Soviet 
negotiation and regain her concessions. According to the Sino-Russian Agreement of 1924, the 
new round of negotiation would soon begin in 1925. The Russians refused to renew the 
negotiation on the pretext of Mukden’s unwillingness to disband the White Russian units in the 
Fengtian Army and Mukden’s decision to construct the Taonan-Qiqihar Railway. 26 Karakhan 
accused Mukden of sheltering the White movement, and threatened to treat Zhang Zuolin as 
enemy. 27  Zhang was unmoved, and refused to allow the flow of Soviet currency into 
Manchuria before the Soviets had compensated the Chinese for their losses when the old tsarist 
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notes were disused.28 Although the Sino-Soviet negotiation was officially renewed in August, 
Karakhan soon left China and the negotiation was delayed indefinitely.29 Immediately after the 
shooting the Soviet Union demanded the Beijing Government to return the concessions of the 
Tsarist Russia, but it was unnoticed by the public.30 
2 SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE 18 MARCH INCIDENT: WAR IN 
NORTHEAST ASIA, OCT 1925-JAN 1926 
The “anti-Fengtian War”, Nov-Dec. 1925 
Throughout the summer, the expansion of the Fengtian Clique and the KMC continued. By 
October, military commissioners of Zhili, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui were Fengtian 
generals. Feng Yuxiang’s position in North China was also strengthened. As the Japanese 
Minister to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi noted, although on surface Feng was on the defensive, 
he was waiting for the moment to strike and was secretly creating an anti-Fengtian alliance.31 
To resist both Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin, the provincial military leaders along the 
Yangtze River formed defensive alliances, and Karakhan suggested in October in Moscow that 
the Soviets should use the anti-Fengtian alliance to eliminate Zhang Zuolin’s influence (thus 
the British and Japanese influence) in Beijing, end the Tariff Conference, and establish a KMT 
government there.32 This decision set the stage for the struggle between the KMT, KMC, and 
the Fengtian Clique for the control of Beijing from late 1925 to March 1926.  
Events between the outbreak of the Zhejiang- Fengtian War and Guo Songling’s rebellion were 
very confusing. During the period saw Zhang Zuolin, who remained suspicious to the 
Provisional Government, fought to maintain the status quo while Feng Yuxiang and his Soviet 
and KMT allies tried to overrun North China and Beijing while secretly fighting for the control 
of the government among themselves.  
On 10 October, provincial forces in Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang led by Sun Chuanfang 
attacked the Fengtian garrison in Nanjing. To prevent the Tariff Conference from being 
interfered by the war, Zhang Zuolin gave up Jiangsu and Anhui, but he was determined to hold 
Zhili and Shandong.33 Zhang, who continuously received reports about increased Soviet 
military action in North Manchuria and Mongolia, feared that Feng and the Soviets would seize 
the chance to attack his position in the north. In response, he suppressed the communist 
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activities in his domain, but the Soviet threat tied down the Fengtian forces deployed along the 
CER.34 
Feng Yuxiang watched closely at the events in Central China. The KMT leftists in Beijing 
persuaded Feng to cooperate with them and overthrow the Provisional Government, but he 
refused.35 He wanted full control of the central government so that he could dominate the gain 
of the coming Tariff Conference.36 Before that, he had to destroy the Fengtian Clique. On the 
other hand, Karakhan hoped to use Feng to create a revolutionary government in Beijing, and 
ordered the Soviet agents in China to sabotage the incoming Tariff Conference. He believed 
that a major war in the north would destroy the Japanese-backed “Zhang-Duan” alliance and 
provide a stage for revolution. To prepare for a coup in Beijing, agitators were sent from 
Canton as delegations, ready to cooperate with the Soviets agents already there.37 
Hard-pressed by Sun Chuanfang, Zhang Zuolin was compelled to negotiate with Feng Yuxiang. 
Zhang had shown so much restrain that the Japanese believed that a major war could be 
averted.38 In fact, both sides were buying time. Despite his peaceful appearance, Feng Yuxiang 
was planning a knockout blow against the Fengtian Clique.39 On the other hand, Zhang was 
willing to cooperate with Feng only because he needed a secured flank when dealing with Sun 
Chuanfang. However, unlike Feng Yuxiang, Zhang only saw war as only a means to restore the 
pre-war situation.  
In early November, the KMC mobilized.40 Feng Yuxiang demanded Zhang Zuolin to withdraw 
from Baoding, to allow the KMC to use the seaport of Tianjin, and to reduce the size of the 
Fengtian forces in North China. In return, Feng guaranteed that he will support the restoration 
of Fengtian position in Jiangsu and Anhui.41 As the Japanese observed, Feng was demanding 
unchallenged position in North China. Still, however, the leaders of the KMC Second Army 
were not satisfied, and the radicals within Feng’s camp (championed by Zhang Zhijiang and Li 
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Liejun, veteran tongmenghui member and now a pro-Soviet KMT envoy to the KMC Second 
Army) urged Feng to seize Zhili and Shandong immediately.42 
Meanwhile, the Fengtian Clique lost Xuzhou to Sun Chuanfang, an event that emboldened the 
radicals among the KMC leadership. The leaders of the KMC Second Army talked openly 
about occupying Shandong, while KMC troops started to move towards Shandong and Zhili.43 
According to Mo Dehui, Zhang’s representative in Beijing, soon after Xuzhou was lost, Feng’s 
troops infiltrated into Beijing and put Duan Qirui in practical house arrest.44 
To deter the KMC, Zhang deployed the best part of the Fengtian Army (commanded by Zhang 
Xueliang and Guo Songling, Xueliang’s close associate) along the Beijing-Mukden Railway 
from Tianjin to Qinhuangdao.45 Zhang’s defensive attitude was shown in his acceptance of 
Duan’s urge for peace and his decision to move his forces away from the capital.46 However, 
the KMC continued their advance. On 17 November, troops of the Second KMC from Henan 
attacked Fengtian outposts near Baoding and invaded Shandong.47 This stiffened Zhang’s 
resolve to fight.  
Guo Songling’s Rebellion and the KMT’s First Attempt to Seize Beijing 
After the Baoding incident, Zhang Zuolin ordered Guo Songling to return to Mukden to discuss 
future moves, but Guo rebelled with the bulk of his army and marched towards Mukden on 23 
November.48 As the war between Guo Songling and Zhang Zuolin is well documented, this 
paper will only focus on Feng Yuxiang’s takeover of Beijing and Japan and Russia’s actions 
during the rebellion.49 
Guo Songling’s rebellion was part of Feng Yuxiang’s plan against Zhang Zuolin. The war in 
November-December 1925 was one of the rare occasions when Feng risked his army. He had 
almost won the gamble. As the Soviet advisors and British observers pointed out, Feng’s army 
was clearly not ready.50 However, Feng feared that the Soviets might eventually withdraw their 
support. Feng was resentful to the spread of communism among his troops and the “excessive 
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Soviet influence” in the area under his control.51  Feng was appalled by the situation in the 
Russia after receiving reports from his military mission to Moscow. In late summer, Feng made 
some “clumsy gesture of friendship” towards the Japanese. He invited the Japanese reporters to 
Kalgan and claimed that he welcomed the Japanese to settle in the Northwest.52  This aroused 
some concern in Moscow, and Karakhan had to acquit Feng’s action by saying he was “driven 
by necessity”.53 With Zhang’s influence within China rapidly diminishing and Guo Songling 
willing to cooperate, Feng finally decided to fight.  
Feng immediately invaded Zhili after Guo’s had broken through the Shanhaiguan and entered 
the Fengtian province.54 The KMC also seized complete control of the capital, after which 
pro-Fengtian politicians of the Provisional Government were dispersed or arrested. However, 
the KMC leaders were divided over how to deal with the situation. The KMT leftists led by Xu 
Qian and the leaders of the Second and Third KMC armies immediately seized the chance to 
stage a coup to overthrow the Provisional Government. On 28 November, after staging a 
so-called Citizen’s Conference (guomin dahui), the KMT members in Beijing marched to the 
executive’s palace to threaten Duan Qirui to resign and an immediate end to the Tariff 
Conference.55 
Feng Yuxiang did not approve of the coup on 28 November as he refused to share the power 
with the KMT. Those in control of Beijing were divided between the radicals led by Xu Qian, 
Li Dazhao and Li Liejun and moderates such as C. T. Wang and Huang Fu.56 Feng refrained 
from taking drastic action, and still favoured the restoration of Huang Fu’s government.57 The 
radicals were relevant to Feng’s plan as long as they can help Feng to seize the control of 
Beijing. Thus, although Feng controlled the capital, its means to achieve it (allying with the 
Soviets and the KMT, starting a war and stirring up radicalism) prevented him from putting up 
with any viable solution to the political problems. The Tariff Conference was also brought to a 
halt because of the war.  
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The Soviet Union was active in supporting Guo and Feng. As mentioned, Karakhan had 
encouraged the anti-Fengtian alliance. During Guo Songling’s rebellion, the Soviet-controlled 
CER refused to carry the Chinese troops to the front, Soviet troops threatened the Sino-Russian 
border in Heilongjiang, and according to the Polish military attaché, the Soviets handed 
200,000 yuan to Guo.58  Money was also sent to Harbin in the hope of bribing the Chinese 
garrison and officials immediately before the rebellion. After all, long before the war the 
Soviets had trained, funded and armed Feng’s army, and had sent agents to stir up anti-foreign 
sentiment throughout 1925. 
Despite the money and effort, however, Karakhan’s scheme to North China failed. Feng 
Yuxiang refused to be restrained by the radicals in a committee government, while his 
Soviet-trained and armed force suffered irrecoverable losses during the attempt to seize Tianjin, 
which was finally captured by the KMC forces on 23 December, the day when Guo Songling 
was defeated and killed by Zhang Zuolin’s troops. Zhang was not defeated, and he was more 
determined than ever to curb the Soviet influence in Northeast Asia as he had attributed Guo’s 
rebellion to Soviets and Feng.59 
3 MUKDEN STRIKES BACK, JAN 1926-DEC 1926 
Strategic Situation after the Guo Songling Rebellion 
Although Guo Songling failed to overthrow Zhang Zuolin, the rebellion allowed the KMC to 
occupy most of the Zhili and Rehe provinces. The KMC was now in control of Beijing, with 
the Provisional Government became nothing more than a hostage. Tianjin was also brought 
under KMC control, thus allowing import of arms from Vladivostok. However, the KMC’s 
position was precarious. Tianjin was captured only after a costly campaign, while a 
considerable part of the defeated Fengtian forces was able link up with Zhang Zongchang’s 
forces in Shandong. Moreover, the KMC Second Army’s invasion of Shandong had failed, and 
after Wu Peifu allied with Zhang Zuolin, Feng had to face a three pronged attack against him. 
Although his army was bloodied and disorganized, Zhang Zuolin insisted on eliminating Feng. 
As Feng and his allies were still controlling Beijing, Zhang remained isolated in Northeast Asia. 
Zhang could turn to the Japanese, but it was the last thing he wanted to do. Thus, although the 
Fengtian army was drastically weakened and the financial situation in Manchuria was more 
chaotic than ever, Zhang still decided to enter North China. Zhang was going to repeat his 
strategy in 1924: he was to secure his position in Manchuria by securing a voice in the central 
government of Beijing.  
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Immediately after the rebellion, Zhang Zuolin instructed Zhang Zongchang to retake Zhili from 
Shandong. 60  The rest of the Fengtian army, now commanded by Zhang Xueliang, was 
reorganized and sent to North China through Shanhaiguan and Rehe. 61  Despite KMC 
resistance along the way, the Fengtian forces advanced steadily throughout February, and were 
approaching Tianjin by March. Wu Peifu, who had recently allied with Zhang Zuolin, was 
besieging Xinyang (信陽), a stronghold of the Second KMC in Henan. Meanwhile, the White 
Russian contingent under Zhang Zongchang planned to capture Kalgan and Russian Far East 
after storming Beijing for money and supplies. As the Soviets Union only maintained a small 
garrison (30,000 men in March 1926) in the Far East, it was not impossible.62 The Chinese, 
however, rejected their plan.  
In January 1926, Feng Yuxiang “resigned” again in the hope of dividing his enemies, but this 
only intensified the division in his own camp. Zhang Zhijiang, Feng’s successor, was more 
sympathetic to the KMT. On the other hand, however, Feng ordered Lu Zhonglin, the 
commander of the Beijing garrison, to suppress the “Bolsheviks”.63 Feng’s successors, all 
brigadiers in less than a year ago, were clearly overwhelmed by the situation. They tried to 
make separate peace with Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Zongchang, and Wu Peifu in the hope of 
playing them against one another. Pro-KMT press in Beijing spread rumours about the collapse 
of the anti-National Army alliance, and orders were given from Beijing in the name of Duan 
Qirui to attack Wu Peifu.64 
Lev Karakhan still hoped to preserve the KMC’s position in and around Beijing and urged 
Moscow to send money, arms and even troops to China.65 The KMC leaders in Beijing decided 
with Karakhan that they would defend Tianjin in order to receive the arms from Vladivostok.66 
However, Rehe and Shanhaiguan were soon lost to the Fengtian army, and the Fengtian armies 
were marching towards Tianjin. In response, KMT leftists tried to stir up anti-foreign sentiment 
and provoke the Japanese to take action. The Japanese were accused of supplying the Fengtian 
army with arms; incidents between the Japanese military and civilians and the KMC occurred 
                                                     
60
 “Zhang Zuolin zhi Zhang Zhongchang diangao,” 26/1/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 2; “Zhang Zuolin fu Zhang 
Zhongchang dian,” 11/2/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 5.  
61
 “Zhang Zuolin zhi Zhang Zhongchang diangao,” 14/2/1926, FM, Vol. 3, 6.  
62
 Chōsen sōtokufu keimu kyokuchō, “Roseia (Russia) hakutō gunjin no Sai-nan shūchū setsu nikansuru ken,” 
19/2/1926, GK, JACAR, B03050150600, slide 421; Fujita sōryōji, “Chō Sō Chō kika no hakutōkei rokoku gunjin 
no kōdō nikansuru ken,” 27/3/1926, GK, JACAR, B03050154800, slide 148-50. 
63
 Tanaka ryōji, “dai 33 gō,” 23/1/1926, GK, JACAR, B03050150100, slide 166; Sai Shi kōshikan fu bukan, “dai 
32 gō,” 19/1/1925, GK, JACAR,B03050150000, slide 97. 
64
 Tienshingun shireikan, “dai 48 gō,” 30/1/1926, “dai 46 gō,” 30/1/1926, GK, JACAR, B03050150200, slides 
202, 205; Tienshingun shireikan, “dai 67 gō,” 10/2/1926, GK, JACAR, B03050150400, slide 325; “Rinji shūsei 
rei,” 22/2/1926, GK, JACAR, B03050150900, slide 560.  
65
 Pekin kōshochō, “Kokumin dai ichi gun no jōkyō,” 15/3/1926, GK, JACAR, B03050151600, slide 143.  
66
 Yoshida sōryōji, “Hō-koku ryōgun saikin no taishi jōkyō nikansuru ken,” 6/2/1926, GK, JACAR, 
B03050192100, slide 41; Sai Shi kōshikan fu bukan, “dai 191 gō,” 18/3/1925, GK, JACAR, B03050152000, slide 
208.  
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
33 
continuously since January.67 The Sino-Japanese tension created by the KMC accumulated to 
the shelling of the Japanese destroyers in Dagu on 12 March.  
As mentioned in the introduction, Fengtian troops under Zhang Zongchang from Shandong 
tried to land in Dagu near Tianjin in early March. After that, the Shandong vessels patrolled 
outside the port, hoping to intercept Soviet shipping to Tianjin. To cover the Russian shipping, 
the KMC mined Dagu and closed the port. On 12 March, the KMC shelled a Japanese destroyer, 
which retaliated by bombarding the KMC’s position. After the shelling, an ultimatum was sent 
from the powers to the KMC demanding the end of blockade before 18th. This incident was 
quickly picked up by the radicals in Feng’s camp. The KMT and pro-KMC press attacked the 
“imperialist intervention”, and Li Liejun advocated war against Japan.68 On 18 March around 
700 agitators, students, and citizens from all walks of life marched to the Office of the 
Provisional Government demanding the formation of a “Nationalist Government” and defiance 
against the powers, but they were fired upon by the troops guarding the Office.69 
As a report received by Zhang Zuolin (written by Ye Gongzuo, who worked for both Zhang 
and Duan) pointed out, the Incident was clearly infighting within the KMC.70 After the failure 
of Guo Songling’s rebellion, Feng was anxious to shake off the accusation of being a 
communist. On the other hand, the KMT leftists and radicals within the KMC still stuck to their 
original strategy and wanted to repeat the 28 November coup. Since the KMC had full control 
of the capital and its intervention had averted bloodshed in the previous agitations and rallies, it 
was inconceivable that the KMC could not prevent the 18 march Incident. Moreover, after the 
shooting the Provisional Government ordered the arrest of the leading KMT leftistsists and 
CCP leaders such as Xu Qian and Li Dazhao, a move that could be seen as the KMC’s attempt 
to curb their influence and prevent them from staging further coups.  
The so-called 18 March Incident did not save the KMC or the radicals. The division of the 
KMC became open after the shooting, while the expected mass uprising against the Provisional 
Government and the powers did not occur. In fact, the long-awaited Soviet arms supply ship 
“Oleg” was captured by the Fengtian navy off Dagu on 17 March.71 As the result, the KMC 
abandoned Tianjin, and those in command again turned to Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin. Perhaps 
to show their sincerity, Cao Kun was released on 9 April. A week later, Lu Zhonglin expelled 
Duan Qirui from Beijing, ending the short-lived Provisional Government. Nonetheless, both 
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Zhang and Wu refused to negotiate and demanded the KMC be disarmed and disbanded.72 The 
KMC then abandoned the capital and withdrew to Nankou, where they prepared to make 
another stand with Soviet support.  
4 CONCLUSION  
With new sources, the 18 March Incident can now be understood from wider perspective. 
Instead of being merely a patriotic or student movement, the 18 March Incident was a 
showdown of the two wings within the National Army, and was part of the struggle for mastery 
in Northeast Asia between China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. This article tries to explain the 
warring sides’ decisions and put them in the geopolitical and international contexts. It shows 
the central importance of geopolitics in political development in Republican China, and the 
necessity to look at the wider context of the revolution when trying to understand the causes of 
the “success” of the Northern Expedition from 1926 to 1928. The period of so-called “national 
revolution” was essentially a period of continuous and confusing wars. The outcome of these 
wars was by no means preordained, and they usually led to consequences unforeseen by those 
who planned them. Thus, an understanding of the strategic and international dimensions of 
these wars is always necessary.  
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